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From: "Frank Conlon" <
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Sent: Saturday, December 22, 2012 10:12 PM
Subject: H-ASIA: REVIEW Brown on Peattie and Drea and van de Ven, _The
Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of
1937-1945_
> H-ASIA
> December 22, 2012
>
> Book Review (orig pub. H-War) by Roger H. Brown on Mark R. Peattie,
> Edward J. Drea and Hans J. van de Ven, eds. _The Battle for China: Essays
> on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945_
>
> (x-post H-Review)
> **********************************************************************
> From: H-Net Staff <
revhelp@mail.h-net.msu.edu>
>
> Mark R. Peattie, Edward J. Drea, Hans J. van de Ven, eds. The Battle
> for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of
> 1937-1945. Stanford Stanford University Press, 2010.
> Illustrations, maps. 664 pp. $65.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8047-6206-9.
>
> Reviewed by Roger H. Brown (Saitama University)
> Published on H-War (December, 2012)
> Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
>
> The Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 was immense both in its scale and
> consequences. Nevertheless, Western military histories of World War
> II have focused overwhelmingly on the campaigns of the European and
> Pacific theaters, and those specialized studies of the conflict that
> do exist deal primarily with such matters as diplomacy; politics;
> mass mobilization; and, in more recent years, Japanese atrocities and
> public memory. Indeed, as the editors of the volume under review
> attest, "a general history of the military operations during the war
> based on Japanese, Chinese, and Western sources does not exist in
> English" (p. xix). In 2004, Japanese, Chinese, and Western scholars
> gathered to remedy this situation and in the belief that such a close
> study of the operations and strategy of the Sino-Japanese War would
> "illustrate that, in this period, warfare drove much of what happened
> in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres in China and
> Japan." They further recognized that because "much of the best
> scholarship on WWII in East Asia is naturally produced in China and
> Japan," there was a need to "bring the fruits of Chinese and Japanese
> work to the attention of a wider public" (p. xx). Granting that the
> resulting volume is not exhaustive, the editors seek to bridge the
> inevitable gaps with "a general overview of the military campaigns,
> an accompanying chronology, and introductions to the several sections
> into which the chapters are grouped" (p. xxi). With that caveat
> behind them, coeditors Mark R. Peattie, Edward J. Drea, and Hans J.
> van de Ven declare that the contributors have provided "an
> authoritative introduction to the military course of one of the
> greatest conflicts of the twentieth century" (p. xx). Their
> confidence is not misplaced, for _The Battle of China_ beautifully
> fulfills the objectives they have laid out for it and will be
> gratefully utilized by readers interested in the history of the
> Sino-Japanese War, World War II, and modern warfare in general.
>
> The contributors' essays are grouped into six parts, the first of
> which includes the chronology mentioned above and overview of the
> war, as well as the book's fourteen maps. Drea and van de Ven open
> this section with solid general coverage of the major campaigns
> between 1937 and 1945. Peattie then discusses the origins of the war,
> placing particular emphasis on the role played by Japanese field
> officers and other "contending interest groups" in perpetuating a
> dysfunctional strategy in China, and on the "structural and political
> weaknesses within Japan that confused the development of a clear-cut
> policy" toward that country (p. 52). Moreover, while also dealing
> with the chaotic domestic conditions in China, he astutely points to
> Japan's failure to learn that its "formula for a dominant position in
> China--a united China submissive to Japanese dictates--was impossibly
> self-contradictory" (p. 60).
>
> The essays in part 2 examine the Chinese Nationalist Army and the
> Imperial Japanese Army on the eve of the war. Chang Jui-Te
> demonstrates that the Chinese army, while making "real progress in
> many areas," continued to be plagued seriously both by internal
> political and military divisions and by unevenness in leadership and
> training (p. 85). In contrast, Drea's survey of the Japanese army's
> tactical and doctrinal proficiency reveals an organization that was
> tough, confident, well trained, and well armed, albeit preparing to
> fight the Soviet Union, rather than China. As part of these
> preparations, the Japanese army updated its infantry tactics in 1937
> to incorporate greater use of firepower and maneuver in assaulting
> fixed positions. Consequently, as Drea points out, when war came with
> China instead, Japanese units, contrary to popular imagination, did
> not rely solely on frontal assaults and the spirit of the bayonet,
> but "brought to bear superior firepower and modern equipment in
> combined arms warfare, relying on regimental heavy weapons and
> artillery to soften enemy positions before infantry assaults" (p.
> 115). Nevertheless, while "the ability of Japanese forces to react
> quickly, maneuver rapidly, and fight skillfully, just as they had
> been trained, equipped, and indoctrinated to do, proved initially
> advantageous," Chinese resilience and the failure to develop a
> long-range strategy made it all "ultimately futile" (p. 134).
>
> Part 3 contains detailed coverage of specific battles and campaigns
> during the first year of the conflict. Yang Tianshi assesses the role
> of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek in the battles of Shanghai and
> Nanjing in the final months of 1937, stressing the generalissimo's
> initiative in using these campaigns to expand the war in order to
> relieve pressure on the North and demonstrate to the world Chinese
> resolve to resist Japanese aggression. Hattori Satoshi and Drea
> collaborate in covering these same operations from the perspective of
> Japanese army units, providing readers a stark infantryman's view of
> the bitter, bloody fighting that took place in the drive from
> Shanghai to Nanjing. While the infantry engaged in close combat,
> higher headquarters on both sides struggled to exercise command and
> control over insubordinate officers. Ultimately, the Chinese would
> have greater success in this vital area than the Japanese. Although
> losing many of their best divisions and control over the capital, the
> Chinese side "slowly, painfully, and often brutally ... fashioned a
> political-military strategy to stave off Japanese victory" (p. 140).
> Indeed, Japan's failure to achieve a rapid victory ensured that the
> war became, contrary to Japanese expectations and to Chinese
> advantage, a war of attrition. Paying particular attention to the
> defense of Wuhan in the summer of 1938, Stephen MacKinnon explains
> how determination to resist the Japanese assault facilitated
> improvement in cooperation among high-level Chinese commanders, the
> implementation of a strategy of attrition, and the growth of
> self-confidence within the Chinese rank and file. Such unity was
> missing on the Japanese side. Carrying the story forward from 1938 to
> 1941, Tobe Ryoichi examines the role of the Eleventh Army, Japan's
> primary fighting forced in central China, demonstrating how a unified
> military strategy continued to elude Japanese leaders in the field
> and in Tokyo as the prospect of rapid military victory evaporated.
>
> The essays of part 4 begin with Hagiwara Mitsuru declaring that the
> Sino-Japanese War was "the first major conflict in which air power
> played a significant role from the beginning of hostilities" and
> which "saw the initiation of long-range over-water strategic
> bombardment by one side against major urban centers of its enemy" (p.
> 237). Addressing the paucity of writing on this topic in
> Western-language accounts, Hagiwara details the Imperial Japanese
> Navy's leadership of a campaign that, despite penetrating deeply into
> the country and achieving local air superiority, failed to achieve
> its strategic objective of destroying Chinese air power.[1] Edna Tow
> follows Hagiwara with a look at what it was like to live and
> persevere in the provisional capital of Chongqing, the primary target
> of Japanese navy bombers and one of the first of the world's cities
> to suffer under the sustained terror bombing of civilians. Tow
> concludes that the aerial assault, which peaked between 1939 and
> 1941, "was insufficient by itself to effect the desired military
> outcome" and "serves as a valuable case study for illuminating the
> range of challenges, tensions, and dilemmas regarding total war and
> the limits of mass aerial bombardment to achieve total victory" (p.
> 282). It was not, however, an example that was then fully appreciated
> in the West.
>
> Zhang Baijia evaluates the military aid provided to China by Germany,
> the Soviet Union, and the United States from the mid-1930s until the
> end of the war, characterizing Nazi assistance as disinterested,
> pragmatic, and effective, and Soviet support as clearly driven by
> strategic self-interest but otherwise largely beyond reproach. He
> judges American aid efforts as riven with misunderstanding and
> largely ineffective and, moreover, asserts that "the United States
> provided little material aid to China" before 1945, when aid
> quadrupled (pp. 299, 303). Although the Sino-Japanese War saw Mao
> Zedong's forces pioneer the concept of "People's War," Yang Kuisong
> revises the picture of guerrilla warfare as the sole preserve of the
> Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by focusing on the less well-known
> unconventional operations of the Nationalist government (KMT). More
> in line with standard understanding of the KMT is Yang's conclusion
> that, despite concerted efforts in this area, Nationalist forces
> never adapted well to the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare, but
> instead alienated local populations by seizing large quantities of
> supplies and often "continued to fight in large units" and attempted
> "to defend large territorial positions" (pp. 308-309).
>
> In the final essay of part 4, Kawano Hitoshi puts a human face on
> Japanese infantrymen and reveals their many similarities with
> soldiers everywhere (including a rate of psychiatric casualties that,
> while on the low side, was roughly in line with that of other
> armies). However, while they shared, for instance, the close personal
> bonds, powerful sense of mutual responsibility, and fatalism common
> to combat units everywhere, Kawano argues that further motivation--or
> perhaps pressure--arose from a powerful concern with preserving
> familial and hometown honor. As for the supposedly supreme motivation
> of fighting and dying for the emperor, one veteran dismissed it as
> follows: "Hell, no. The emperor? I didn't give a damn" (p. 343).
> While perhaps extreme, such reflections are important in tempering
> likewise extreme and persistent stereotypes regarding the motivations
> of Japanese soldiers and sailors. Kawano also touches on, but might
> have pursued further, given its relevance to campaigning and
> pacification, the needless brutality exemplified in such criminal
> practices as "bloodying" new soldiers by having them bayonet Chinese
> prisoners of war.[2]
>
> Asano Toyomi opens part 5 with an examination of how Japanese forces
> shifted from the offensive to the defensive in Yunnan and northern
> Burma following the Fifteenth Army's disastrous Imphal operation
> (March to July 1944) by utilizing their knowledge of the terrain and
> well-constructed fortifications to blunt Chinese drives into the
> region and, later, to mount limited counterattacks in support of the
> Ichigo operation (April 1944 to February 1945). Zhang Yunhu
> looks--albeit briefly in five pages--at the campaign from the
> perspective of the American-trained and American-supplied Y-Force,
> which, despite initial setbacks and leadership shakeups, eventually
> succeeded in isolating Japan's Thirty-third Army and mostly reopening
> the Ledo Road. Hara Takeshi assesses the Ichigo operation as
> successful but strategically pointless because of developments in the
> Pacific; moreover, he concludes, the poor performance and losses of
> the Nationalists undermined American faith in the KMT, while the
> removal of both Nationalist and Japanese forces from north China left
> a vacuum to be filled by the CCP, whom he identifies as the ultimate
> winner. Looking at the battles of Henan and Hunan, Wang Qisheng finds
> evidence for Nationalist failings in this period from the pen of
> Chiang, who wrote that "1944 is the worst year for China in its
> protracted war against Japan.... I'm fifty-eight years old this year.
> Of all the humiliations I have suffered in my life, this is the
> greatest" (p. 403). Wang bolsters his case for KMT failures in
> "strategy and tactics, officers and soldiers, training, logistics,
> and mobilization of civilians" with further observations from Chiang,
> who lamented that the local population "attacked our own forces and
> seized their arms, just as happened with the czar's army in imperial
> Russia during World War I. Such an army cannot win! Our military
> trucks and horses smuggled goods, not ammunition.... During the
> retreat, some troops lost discipline, looting and raping women" (p.
> 417). "Our biggest humiliation in the battles of Henan and of Hunan,"
> Chiang concluded, "was that the Japanese used Chinese people as
> plain-clothes personnel, while we were not able to do so. With the
> exception of one general, no Nationalist army unit was able to
> mobilize our own people in our service" (p. 418).
>
> Part 6 concludes the volume with three perspectives on the larger
> historical significance of the war. Despite the collaborative spirit
> behind their project, the editors acknowledge that the continued
> sensitivity of the topic resulted in occasional flashes of irritation
> among the Chinese; Japanese; and--more surprisingly--American
> participants. Perhaps no issue is more contentious than that of
> assessing China's role in determining the outcome of World War II.
> For instance, many in the West have been influenced by Barbara
> Tuchman's biographical channeling of General Joseph Stilwell's
> dislike for Chiang and disparagement of the Nationalist war effort.
> Meanwhile, for millions of Chinese the war was one of tremendous
> bloodshed and destruction and, naturally enough, an unavoidably
> Sino-centric affair. The influence of political ideology has often
> been apparent in evaluating the war's significance, too, even from
> the first days of the conflict. Shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge
> incident of July 7, 1937, the Japanese left-wing journalist, China
> hand, and Comintern spy Ozaki Hotsumi wrote that the war in China
> "can hardly fail to develop on such a scale as to prove of utmost
> significance in world history" and, in the years leading up to his
> 1944 execution for espionage, insisted that China, rather than the
> Pacific or Europe, was the key theater of the war (p. xix).
> Subsequently, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has promoted the
> idea that, as the editors put it, "the China theater was not merely
> important, it was _the_ critical theater in World War II" (p. 422,
> emphasis in the original).[3]
>
> Tohmatsu Haruo tackles this issue head-on by examining the
> interrelationship between the Chinese and Pacific theaters of the
> war, demonstrating that while developments in the Pacific often
> affected the war in China, the opposite was seldom the case.
> Likewise, the continued stationing of large numbers of Japanese
> troops on the continent in the final stages of the war reflected not
> their requirement to combat Chinese armies but the reality that most
> of Japan's transport vessels lay on the bottom of the Pacific. The
> fact that they rested there primarily because of American submarine
> warfare further illustrates the military significance of the Pacific
> campaign. And it was Allied success in seizing island bases and
> taking control of the sea and air that brought physical destruction
> to the Japanese armed forces and, ultimately, to the homeland,
> thereby bringing about Japan's military defeat.
>
> Assessing China's contribution to victory, van de Ven takes issue
> with the Western consensus that the Nationalists "were a politically
> debilitated 'husk' who had wasted the United States' 'supreme' try in
> China" (p. 449). He counters--in accord with other essays in this
> volume--that the Nationalists were in fact quite determined to resist
> Japan and further argues that "the slighting of the Nationalists as
> militarist, backward, feudal, and incompetent derived in part from a
> Western-centric interpretation of the war and, more generally, from
> an understanding of warfare that judged societies by their ability to
> generate modern industrialized offensive warfare" (p. 464). In
> support of his argument, van de Ven contends that the Nationalists'
> "accommodation with local warlords, the exploitation of historically
> shaped methods of military mobilization, and the use of the frontier
> regions" did not constitute "evidence of feudal backwardness" but
> rather demonstrated "sensible ways of pursuing a difficult war
> against an overwhelmingly superior enemy in a largely rural society
> with limited industrial resources and a weak state" (p. 465). In
> short, the KMT's strategic objective was to outlast Japan's assault
> and this was pursued within the constraints and realities of Chinese
> society at the time.
>
> In the book's final essay, Ronald Spector surveys the contributors'
> efforts and judiciously concludes that despite the fact that the
> Sino-Japanese War's "sheer scale, length, and destructiveness" placed
> it "in a class by itself," China's contribution to Allied victory in
> World War II was "at best, secondary" (pp. 467, 478). Among the
> reasons for this were the herculean logistical challenges facing
> Allied support efforts; the Allied strategic priority of defeating
> Germany first; the naval character of the primary counterattack
> against Japan; and, thanks to the success of the Pacific
> island-hopping campaign and the development of the B-29 heavy bomber,
> the declining need to use China as an avenue for attacking the
> Japanese homeland. At the same time, Spector cogently points out that
> "if the strategic impact of the war in China on the Unites States'
> war against Japan was small, this outcome was not true of the
> political and psychological contribution that China made to the
> Allied cause simply by staying in the war. The Japanese claim to be
> fighting a war to liberate all Asians from the Western imperialists
> could never be given full credence as long as Asia's most populous
> and largest nation was ranged on the side of the Allies." Moreover,
> "millions of Chinese did not endure the hardships and losses of seven
> long years of war to ensure an Allied victory but to liberate their
> country from the Japanese" and the achievement of that goal was "the
> vindication of their sacrifices and the ultimate victory of their
> cause" (p. 479).
>
> Despite its length, this review has only scratched the surface of the
> wealth of information and interpretation provided by this collection
> of essays. While the contributors and editors get the credit for that
> content, Stanford University Press should be commended for producing
> an attractive volume of this length and one that, in addition to the
> aforementioned chronology, maps, and photographs, even includes an
> annotated bibliography. Perhaps the most unfortunate and noteworthy
> editorial flaw in this otherwise solid publication is the excessive
> number of mistakes in the transliteration of Japanese terms,
> particularly in the book's character list; one hopes these will be
> addressed should the opportunity present itself.
>
> In sum, _The Battle for China_ is a very welcome contribution to the
> military history of the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, as
> well as to the general historiography of modern China and Japan. I
> highly recommend it.
>
> Notes
>
> [1]. A notable exception, as Hagiwara points out, is Mark R. Peattie,
> _Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941_
> (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
>
> [2]. The editors address the matter of war crimes as follows:
> "Although Japan's record of war crimes is a topic of great current
> interest, Japanese atrocities are mentioned only if pertinent to a
> particular campaign or strategy. Thus, no paper specifically
> addresses war crimes, in part because the topic is a subject unto
> itself that has been dealt with in a range of books, monographs, and
> journals. The recently published National Archives and Records
> Administration report to Congress on the subject is a good place to
> start for those interested in Japanese war crimes" (p. xxi).
>
> [3]. While the editors do not mention it, the view of Ozaki and the
> PRC also gained considerable traction among left-wing Japanese
> scholars in the decades following the war. Historian Ienaga Saburo,
> for instance, wrote in 1968 that the "invasion of China and the
> subsequent military operations there were the core of the Pacific
> War, in my view. China remained the main war theater even after the
> hostilities with America and England began. The principal opponent in
> China was not the Nationalist government's armies but the Communist
> units. Because of the Communists' tenacious resistance, Japanese
> forces became bogged down in China." Ienaga further credited "the
> democratic power of the Red armies" with overcoming Japanese
> superiority in weapons and concluded dubiously that while "America's
> material superiority may have struck the decisive blow,... Japan had
> already been defeated by Chinese democracy." Ienaga Saburo, _The
> Pacific War, 1931-1945_ (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 95-96. In
> an appended commentary to a recent reprint of Ienaga's book,
> historian Yoshida Yutaka identified this perspective as one of
> Ienaga's key contributions and one that delivered a shocking and
> "powerful message" to him as a young college student enamored of U.S.
> military strength. Yoshida Yutaka, commentary in _Taiheiyo senso_, by
> Iengaga Saburo(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002), 459, 462-463.
>
> Citation: Roger H. Brown. Review of Peattie, Mark R.; Drea, Edward
> J.; van de Ven, Hans J., eds., _The Battle for China: Essays on the
> Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945_. H-War, H-Net
> Reviews. December, 2012.
> URL:
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35560
>
> This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
> Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
> License.
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